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NOTES
THE COMPUTER SOFTWARE RENTAL
AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1990: ANOTHER
BEND IN THE FIRST SALE
DOCTRINE*
The first sale doctrine is a basic principle of copyright law.1 The doctrine
extinguishes a copyright owner's exclusive right to distribute2 an individual
copy of a copyrighted work once the work is lawfully acquired by another.3
It thus allows the purchaser of a work to sell, rent or otherwise dispose of
the work without the copyright owner's permission.4 The doctrine "has a
* This Note was entered in the Nathan Burkan Memorial Competition, which is
sponsored by the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers.
1. In his opening remarks at the House subcommittee hearing on the Computer Software
Rental Amendments Act of 1990 (Software Act), Chairman Kastenmeier explained that "'[a]
bill to change the first sale doctrine, then, is not a modest proposal. It is... a major substan-
tive proposal involving a fundamental change in one of the main tenets of copyright law.'"
Software Rental Amendments of 1990: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual
Property and the Admin. of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
2 (1990) [hereinafter House Software Hearing] (statement of Rep. Robert Kastenmeier) (quot-
ing Prof. David Lange).
2. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106(3) (West 1977 & Supp. 1991).
3. 17 U.S.C.A. § 109 (West 1977 & Supp. 1991); Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S.
339, 350-51 (1908) (holding that copyright owner who sold books could not dictate the future
sale price of books); Walt Disney Prods. v. Basmajian, 600 F. Supp. 439, 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(denying preliminary injunction to prevent defendant's sale of art work because copyright
owner's right of exclusive distribution was extinguished when the work was given to the de-
fendant); see United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir.) (discussing the first sale
doctrine but upholding finding of infringement because there was no first sale), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 929 (1977); T.B. Harms Co. v. JEM Records, Inc., 655 F. Supp. 1575, 1582 (D.N.J.
1987) (same); H.R. REP. No. 735, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6938. See infra note 44 for the partial text of § 109.
4. E.g., Sebastian Int'l, Inc. v. Consumer Contacts (PTY) Ltd., 847 F.2d 1093, 1099 (3d
Cir. 1988) (vacating district court's grant of injunction to prevent sale of copyrighted materials
because of the first sale doctrine); Independent News Co. v. Williams, 293 F.2d 510, 515-17
(3d Cir. 1961) (upholding denial of claim for violation of distribution right because copy-
righted comic books which defendant resold had already been sold by the plaintiff); Burke &
Van Heusen, Inc. v. Arrow Drug, Inc., 233 F. Supp. 881, 884 (E.D. Pa. 1964) (rejecting copy-
right owner's claim for violation of distribution right because the first sale doctrine had extin-
guished the exclusive distribution right, even though a contract with the pharmacist required
that the works only be given away with shampoo purchases); see also Columbia Pictures In-
dus., Inc. v. Redd Home, Inc., 749 F.2d 154, 159-60 (3d Cir. 1984) ("The first sale doctrine
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venerable lineage" 5-- courts recognized it at least as early as 18866 and it has
been part of the federal copyright law since 1909.' For nearly a century, it
has prevented copyright owners from asserting their copyright interests to
prevent or condition the future disposition of copyrighted works that they
have sold or given away.'
The ease with which modem technology allows works to be illegally du-
plicated9 and the corresponding difficulty in detecting such duplication"° has
prevents the copyright owner from controlling the future transfer of a particular copy once its
material ownership has been transferred."); American Int'l Pictures, Inc. v. Foreman, 576
F.2d 661, 663-64 (5th Cir. 1978) ("The first sale thus extinguishes the copyright holder's abil-
ity to control the course of copies placed in the stream of commerce.").
5. Sebastian Int'l, 847 F.2d at 1096.
6. Henry Bill Publishing Co. v. Smythe, 27 F. 914, 923 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1886). The
Henry Bill court held that an infringement had occurred, despite the first sale doctrine, because
the works in question had not been lawfully sold. Although the doctrine soon would become
part of the federal copyright law, Judge Freedman's 1964 opinion in Burke & Van Heusen,
Inc. v. Arrow Drug, Inc., 233 F. Supp. 881 (E.D. Pa. 1964), was the first time that it was
described as the "first sale doctrine" by a federal court. Search of LEXIS Genfed Library,
Courts file (Jan. 24, 1992).
7. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 41, 35 Stat. 1075, 1084 (stating that "nothing in [the
copyright law] shall be deemed to forbid, prevent or restrict the transfer of any copy of a
copyrighted work the possession of which has been lawfully obtained") (current version at 17
U.S.C.A. § 109).
The federal copyright law is currently codified in title 17 of the United States Code. All
references to "copyright law" or "the copyright law" refer to federal copyright law.
8. See, e.g., Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350-51 (1908); Sebastian Int'l, 847
F.2d at 1096; Independent News, 293 F.2d at 515-17; Harrison v. Maynard, Merrill & Co., 61
F. 689, 690 (2d Cir. 1894) (holding that copyright owner who sold burned books as scrap
could not use their copyright to prevent used book seller from re-selling the books); Para-
mount Pictures Corp. v. Video Broadcasting Sys., 724 F. Supp. 808, 821 (D. Kan. 1989) (re-
jecting on first sale doctrine grounds movie producer's claim for infringement of the
distribution right); Burke & Van Heusen, 233 F. Supp. at 883-84; Fawcett Publications, Inc. v.
Elliot Publishing Co., 46 F. Supp. 717, 718 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) (holding that resale of plaintiff's
copyrighted comic books in rebound format was not a violation of plaintiff's copyright because
of first sale doctrine).
Notwithstanding the first sale doctrine, copyright owners are still able to exert legal control
over future disposition of their works through contracts with the purchasers. See infra notes
93-97 and accompanying text.
9. Unless authorized by the copyright owner, the duplication of a copyrighted computer
program or any other copyrighted work is generally a violation of the copyright. 17 U.S.C.A.
§ 106(1). One exemption to this prohibition is 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1988), which allows duplica-
tion of copyrighted computer software for certain specific purposes. For a discussion of this
section, see infra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
10. Copyright infringement has become more difficult to detect because it is no longer
necessary to use or duplicate works in highly visible and easily policeable establishments such
as movie theaters or print shops, but instead they can be used and duplicated in such hard-to-
police places as the home or office. See H.R. REP. No. 735, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted
in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6938 (stating that "technology has been both a boon and a bane to
authors: a boon because it has fostered new methods of creation and distribution; a bane be-
cause it has also resulted in inexpensive, easy and quick ways to reproduce copyrighted works,
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led to a number of movements to create exceptions to the first sale doc-
trine.'" Using equipment available to most consumers,' 2 it is now easy to
make accurate duplicates of works recorded in many different media at a
fraction of the work's retail cost.' 3 The only barriers to duplication are the
public's knowledge of and respect for copyright law and a lack of physical
access to a copy of the desired work.' 4 Rental removes this latter barrier by
affording cheap, easy and well-publicized access to copyrighted works.' 5
in many cases in private or semi-private environments that render detection all but impossi-
ble"); see also Paul Goldstein, Copyright in the New Information Age, 40 CATH. U. L. REv. 829
(1991).
11. See H.R. REP. No. 735, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935,
6938; 136 CONG. REC. H8266 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1990) (statement of Rep. Moorhead) ("Leg-
islation to reform the first sale doctrine frequently arises from a collision course between intel-
lectual property law and technological change.").
The Record Rental Amendment of 1984 was the only successful attempt at making an ex-
emption to the first sale doctrine. Record Rental Amendment of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-450, 98
Stat. 1727 (codified at 17 U.S.C.A. § 109(b)(l)(a) (West Supp. 1991)). Under this amendment,
the owner of a copy of a phonorecord containing copyrighted material may not rent the record
for purposes of direct or indirect commercial advantage without the permission of the copy-
right owner. Id. Companion legislation that would have exempted video tape rentals from the
first sale doctrine was never approved by Congress. H.R. 1029, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1983),
reprinted in Audio and Video First Sale Doctrine: Hearings on H.R. 1027, H.R. 1029 and S. 32
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Admin. of Justice of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 729 (1984, 1985) [hereinafter House Audio and Video
Hearings]; S. 33, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), reprinted in Audio and Video Rental: Hearings
on S. 32 and S. 33 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1983) [hereinafter Senate Audio and Video
Hearings]. For a discussion of the Record Rental Amendment of 1984 and the proposed Con-
sumer Video Sales-Rental Amendment, see infra notes 75-82 and accompanying text.
12. Audio works, for example, can be copied using a standard audio cassette player. Al-
most every computer is capable of duplicating computer programs. See Computer Software
Rental Amendments Act of 1988: Hearings on S. 2727 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copy-
rights and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1988)
[hereinafter 1988 Senate Software Hearings] (testimony of Heidi Roizen, President, T/Maker
Co.); Computer Software Rental Amendments Act of 1989: Hearings on S. 198 Before the Sub-
comm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1989) [hereinafter 1989 Senate Software Hearings] (statement of Ralph
Oman, Register of Copyrights).
13. In 1988, the popular word processing program WordPerfect sold at retail for up to
$495 and could be copied in seconds onto $11 worth of computer diskettes, and the typical
compact disc (CD) audio recording sold for about $16.95 and could be copied onto a tape in
about one hour. 1988 Senate Software Hearings, supra note 12, at 10 (statement of Dr. Alan C.
Ashton, President, WordPerfect Corp.); id. at 15 (testimony of Heidi Roizen, President, T/
Maker Co).
14. Heidi Roizen, testifying as President of the Software Publishers Association, argued
that the Software Act was needed because "the software industry has had to rely on moral
suasion to prevent people from stealing our products through software rentals." 1989 Senate
Software Hearings, supra note 12, at 38.
15. WordPerfect could be rented through the mail at a price of around $35 in 1988. 1989
Senate Software Hearings, supra note 12, at 17 (statement of Ralph Oman, Register of Copy-
1991]
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The Computer Software Rental Amendments Act of 199016 (Software
Act) created an exemption from the first sale doctrine for the rental of com-
puter software. 17 This exemption gives the owners of software copyrights
control over the rental of their programs by making it a copyright violation
to rent computer software without the permission of the copyright owner.
The goal of the Software Act is to protect the software industry from sales
rights). When the Record Rental Amendment of 1984 was passed, CD's were renting at about
$2-45, id. at 22, and were advertised in ads that encouraged copying. See infra note 76. For
further explanation of how rental facilitates illegal duplication, see Michael G. Ryan, Note,
Offers Users Can't Refuse: Shrink- Wrap License Agreements As Enforceable Adhesion Con-
tracts, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 2105, 2105-06 (1989), and Judith K. Smith, Note, The Computer
Software Rental Act: Amending the "First Sale Doctrine" to Protect Computer Software Copy-
right, 20 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1613, 1626-28 (1987).
16. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 801-805, 104 Stat. 5089,
5134 (1990) (codified at 17 U.S.C.A. § 109(b)-(d) (West Supp. 1991)). For the text of the
pertinent part of the amended § 109, see infra note 44.
The Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 was passed in a flurry of last minute legislation at
the end of the 101st Congress. See Clean Air, Budget, Other Laws Finally Passed, NUCLEAR
NEWS, Dec. 1990, at 72 ("Within its final 24 hours, before it adjourned at 2:00 a.m. on Sun-
day, October 28, the 101st Congress passed 72 bills and joint resolutions, approved three trea-
ties, and confirmed 39 executive branch nominations.").
17. 17 U.S.C.A. § 109(b)(l)(a).
Software can be defined as "[t]he instructions, programs, or suite of programs which are
used to direct the operations of a computer, or other hardware." A.J. MEADOWS ET AL.,
DICTIONARY OF COMPUTING & INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 226 (3d ed. 1987). The copy-
right law defines a computer program as a "set of statements or instructions to be used directly
or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result," 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988),
and allows certain aspects of computer programs to be protected as "literary works." 17
U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (1988); see Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix Control Sys., Inc., 886 F.2d
1173, 1175-76 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding that the "structur[al], sequenti[al] and/or organiza-
tion[al]" components of a computer program may be protected by copyright); Whelan Assocs.,
Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1248 (3d Cir. 1986) (finding programs copy-
rightable when as source code (a written form understandable to humans) and as object code
(the translation of source code into a series of digits for use by the computer)), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1031 (1987); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1249 (3d
Cir. 1983) (same), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984); H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 54 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5667 (stating that the category "literary
works" includes "computer programs to the extent that they incorporate authorship in the
programmer's expression of original ideas"). Exactly which aspects of a computer program
are copyrightable is still subject to debate. See, e.g., Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software
Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 68 (D. Mass. 1990) (finding the "user interface" of the program Lotus 1-
2-3 to be copyrightable); Steven W. Lundberg et al., Baker v. Selden, Computer Programs, 17
US.C Section 102(b) and Whelan revisited, 13 HAMLINE L. REV. 221 (1990); Peter S. Menell,
An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Application Programs, 41 STAN. L. REV.
1045 (1989); Steven R. Englund, Note, Idea, Process or Protected Expression?. Determining the
Scope of Copyright Protection of the Structure of Computer Programs, 88 MICH. L. REV. 866
(1990).
[Vol. 41:177
Computer Software Rental Amendments Act
lost when potential purchasers rent and make copies of software instead of
purchasing the products.18
The purpose of copyright law is to benefit the public by promoting the
creation of works of authorship, and any changes to the copyright law
should be designed to carry out this purpose. 9 This Note first examines the
rights granted by a copyright, the various limitations upon those rights, and
the rationale behind those rights and limitations. Next, this Note discusses
the first sale doctrine and examines previous attempts to amend the doctrine.
This Note then analyzes whether, short of bending the doctrine, there are
any other possible solutions to resolve the problem of illegal copying of
rented software. After evaluating the Software Act in light of its intended
purpose, this Note concludes that, although a software rental exemption to
the first sale doctrine probably furthers that purpose, the Software Act was
not carefully drafted and could have unintended and undesired effects. Fi-
nally, this Note looks at the future prospects for rental rights and the first
sale doctrine. As the distinction between computer programs and other
works blurs,20 and as it becomes easier to duplicate works, a careful determi-
nation must be made as to whether society will benefit more by allowing the
free alienability of creative works or by allowing copyright owners to control
their future distribution.
I. THE GOAL OF COPYRIGHT LAW AND THE SCOPE
OF ITS PROTECTION
A. Providing for Public Benefit by Allowing for Private Profit
A copyright is "the grant of a monopoly over expression."'" Although
our free market system is based on open competition, exceptions are allowed
18. See Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Technology, 939 F.2d 91, 96 n.7 (3d Cir. 1991)
(discussing the motivation behind the Software Act).
Peter Beruk, a spokesmen for the Software Publishers Association, estimates that at least
one illegally made copy is in use for every software product legitimately sold. Janet Mason,
Crackdown on Software Pirates, COMPUTERWORLD, Feb. 5, 1990, at 107. According to the
Software Publishers Association, illegal software duplication cost the industry $2.4 billion in
revenues in 1990. Software Group Says Money Lost to Piracy Fell Slightly in 1990, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 7, 1991, at B5.
19. See infra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 148-55 and accompanying text.
21. Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 983, 984
(1970); see Stewart v. Abend, 110 S. Ct. 1750, 1768 (1990) (stating that copyright owners have
monopoly privileges); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 544
(1985) (discussing copyright as a monopoly on expression).
One could argue that copyright is not a monopoly in the true sense of the word because
copyrighted works must compete with other similar works in the marketplace. See, e.g.,
STAFF OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., 1ST SESS., REPORT OF THE
1991]
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when there is proper justification.22 The justification for granting copyrights
is to provide incentive for the creation of works of authorship.23 Because
development expenses often comprise the bulk of the cost of producing an
artistic or literary work, it is often possible to reproduce and sell copies of
the work at a cost that is only a fraction of the author's original invest-
ment.24 Without the protection of copyright law, the release of an author's
product into the market could destroy the market for the product and pre-
vent the author from ever recouping his investment.25 The aim of copyright
law is thus to promote the creation and dissemination of works by allowing
authors to be financially rewarded.26
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 3-6
(Comm. Print 1961). This Note, however, considers the effect of increasing the rights of copy-
right owners to be the same whether or not copyright affords a true monopoly.
22. For example, even though the intentional monopolization of interstate trade has been
a federal crime since 1890, Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, § 2, 26 Stat. 209 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West Supp. 1991)), monopolies are allowed under certain cir-
cumstances. One familiar example is the natural monopoly. See United States v. Aluminum
Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945) (stating that a producer is not guilty of violating
the federal antitrust law if it is put in a monopoly position because the market will only sup-
port one producer).
23. The United States Constitution gives Congress the power to grant copyrights in order
"[t]o promote the Progress of Science," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, the term "Science"
having been used to mean general knowledge. See Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States,
487 F.2d 1345, 1382 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (Cowen, J., dissenting), aff'd, 420 U.S. 376 (1975). The
preamble to the first federal copyright statute stated that it was passed "for the encouragement
of learning." Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1802, 1819, 1831, 1834); see
also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (stating that
copyright law is intended to motivate authors by providing them with a reward); United States
v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (stating that "[t]he sole interest of the
United States and the primary object in conferring the monopoly lie in the general benefits
derived by the public from the labors of authors" (quoting Fox Film Corp. v. Doyle, 286 U.S.
123, 127 (1932))); H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1909) (explaining that "[t]he
granting of [the copyright law's] exclusive rights, under the proper terms and conditions, con-
fers a benefit upon the public that outweighs the evils of the temporary monopoly").
24. Although a copy of WordPerfect can be made for $1l, 1988 Senate Software Hearings,
supra note 12, at 15 (statement of Heidi Roizen), the president of the WordPerfect Corpora-
tion explained that it sells for over $200 per copy because its development took years of re-
search by highly educated employees using high technology equipment. Id. at 11 (statement of
Dr. Alan C. Ashton).
25. Jon Shirley, President and Chief Operating Officer of industry-leading Microsoft Cor-
poration, stressed the value of adequate copyright protection to the software industry by stat-
ing: "In short, what we at Microsoft produce is intellectual property, which only has value as
long as the copyright laws of the United States and other nations give us the right to receive
payment when it is copied and used." 1989 Senate Software Hearings, supra note 12, at 43.
26. See Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. at 158 ("It is said that reward to the author or artist
serves to induce release to the public of the products of his creative genius."). Thus, the copy-
right law is not "primarily designed to provide a special private benefit," but rather to promote
creation of expression by granting private individuals certain exclusive rights over that expres-
sion. Sony, 464 U.S. at 429.
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To achieve its purpose, copyright law requires a balancing of the need to
encourage creativity through private incentive against the over-arching de-
sire to provide public access to the works created.27 Giving authors too little
control over their works may destroy their incentive to create socially valua-
ble works. In contrast, giving them too much control may deny the public
the benefit of authors' creations. The balance is achieved by giving creators
certain exclusive rights28 and then placing a number of limitations on the
monopoly which those rights provide. Some of these limitations are built
into the fundamental parameters of the copyright law, while others explicitly
limit exclusive rights. Examples of limits built into the copyright law's fun-
damental parameters are the principle that ideas cannot be copyrighted29
and the constitutional requirements that copyrights be granted only "for
27. See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
The limited scope of the copyright holder's statutory monopoly, like the limited
scope of copyright duration required by the Constitution, reflects a balance of com-
peting claims upon the public interest: Creative work is to be encouraged and re-
warded, but private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad
public availability of literature, music, and the other arts.
Id. (footnote omitted); see also Sony, 464 U.S. at 429-30 n. 10 (quoting the following descrip-
tion of the copyright balance from a Congressional report: "'In enacting a copyright law
Congress must consider ... two questions: First, how much will the legislation stimulate the
producer and so benefit the public; and, second, how much will the monopoly granted be
detrimental to the public?'" (omission in original) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong.,
2nd Sess. 7 (1909))).
28. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106 (West 1977 & Supp. 1991); see infra notes 33-35 and accompanying
text.
29. This principle is codified at 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988), which states: "In no case does
copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process,
system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery." See, e.g., Feist Publications,
Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282, 1287 (1991) (stating that it is a well-established
copyright principle "that facts are not copyrightable"); Whelan Assocs., Inc., v. Jaslow Dental
Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1234-36 (3d Cir. 1986) (discussing the distinction between the idea
and expression elements of a computer program), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987); J. Dianne
Brinson, Copyrighted Software: Separating the Protected Expression from Unprotected Ideas, A
Starting Point, 29 B.C. L. REV. 803 (1988).
1991]
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limited [t]imes" and for "[w]ritings. ' ' 3' Examples of explicit limitations on
exclusive rights are the fair use3 and first sale doctrines.
B. The Nature of Copyright Protection and the First Sale Doctrine
A copyright protects the author's "right to exploit the work in a particular
way and to prevent others from exploiting the work in that way without first
obtaining permission. '32 Copyright ownership consists of five exclusive
rights:33 the right to reproduce the work, the right to derive new works from
the work,34 the right to distribute copies of the work, and the rights to pub-
30. The Constitution gives Congress the power to grant copyrights "[t]o promote the Pro-
gress of Science ... by securing for limited Times to Authors ... the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Copyrights for new works are currently given for the life of the author plus 50 years. 17
U.S.C. § 302(a) (1988). The "writings" limitation has been broadly construed to permit copy-
righting of musical works, movies and computer programs. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988). For a
discussion of the copyrightability of computer programs, see supra note 17. An example of
expansion in the realm of copyrightable expression is the Architectural Works Copyright Pro-
tection Act, which was passed as part of the same legislation as the Software Act and which
amended the copyright law to allow for copyright protection of architectural works. Judicial
Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 701-706, 104 Stat. 5089, 5133 (codified at
17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101, 102(a), 106, 120, 301(b) (West 1977 & Supp. 1991)).
31. The fair use doctrine is a principle under which the copyright owner's exclusive rights
do not prohibit others from making a "fair use" of their copyrighted works. 17 U.S.C. § 107
(1988); see, e.g., Rubin v. Boston Magazine Co., 645 F.2d 80, 83 (1st Cir. 1981) (" 'Fair use' is
a 'privilege in others than the owner of a copyright to use copyrighted material in a reasonable
manner without his consent.'" (quoting HORACE G. BALL, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND
LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944))).
32. BARBARA A. RINGER & PAUL GITLIN, COPYRIGHTS 20 (1965).
33. These rights are codified in 17 U.S.C.A. § 106 (West 1977 & Supp. 1991), which states
that the owner of a copyright has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the
following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by
sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copy-
righted work publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual
images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted
work publicly.
17 U.S.C.A. § 106.
34. A derivative work is defined as follows:
A "derivative work" is a work based upon one or more pre-existing works, such as
a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture
version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgement, condensation, or any other
form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of
[Vol. 41:177
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licly perform and publicly display certain types of works.35 The rights
granted in the work of authorship by the copyright are distinct from the
ownership rights in any material object on which the work is recorded.3 6
Thus, the property rights in an individual copy of a copyrighted work can be
divided into two distinct bundles. One bundle contains the copyright
owner's intellectual property rights-the five rights granted to him under his
copyright. 37 The other bundle contains all the rights in the material object
normally flowing from the ownership of personal property, excluding the
five intellectual property rights reserved to the copyright owner. A transfer
in the ownership of either bundle generally does not affect the ownership
rights in the other.3a
editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a
whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a "derivative work."
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
35. Public display and public performance are defined as follows:
To "display" a work means to show a copy of it, either directly or by means of a
film, slide, television image, or any other device or process or, in the case of a motion
picture or other audiovisual work, to show individual images nonsequentially.
To "perform" a work means to recite, render, play, dance, or act it, either directly
or by means of any device or process or, in the case of a motion picture or other
audiovisual work, to show its images in any sequence or to make the sounds accom-
panying it audible.
To perform or display a work "publicly" means-
(1) to perform or display it at a place open to the public or at any place where
a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social
acquaintances is gathered; or
(2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the
work to a place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of any device or
process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance or
display receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at
different times.
17 U.S.C. § 101.
36. This principle is codified in 17 U.S.C. § 202 (1988), which states that:
Ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights under a copyright, is
distinct from ownership of any material object in which the work is embodied.
Transfer of ownership of any material object ... does not of itself convey any rights
in the copyrighted work embodied in the object; nor, in the absence of an agreement,
does transfer of ownership of a copyright or of any exclusive rights under a copyright
convey property rights in any material object.
17 U.S.C. § 202.
37. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5674 (stating that the five rights granted by § 106 "comprise the so-called
'bundle of rights' that is a copyright").
38. The one exception is that, under the first sale doctrine, the exclusive right to dis-
tribute, and in some cases to publicly display and perform, a particular copy of a work is
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The copyright owner's exclusive rights are explicitly limited in various
ways by the copyright law.39 For example, the exclusive right to reproduce
computer programs is limited in that the owner of a copy of a computer
program may make duplicate copies for either of two specific purposes: A
program may be copied provided that the copy is essential for use with a
particular computer system and is used only in that manner," and a copy
may be made if it is used as a back-up in case the original, rightfully owned
copy is accidentally destroyed.4 This balancing is necessary because pur-
chasers must be able to copy programs for these purposes in order to make
meaningful use of them.42
The first sale doctrine limits the copyright owner's exclusive rights to dis-
tribute his work.4 3 Codified in § 109 of the copyright law, the first sale doc-
generally extinguished upon the first transfer in the ownership of the material object upon
which the work is recorded. See infra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
The distinction between the copyrighted work and the object upon which it is recorded is
essential to understanding the first sale doctrine.
39. These limitations are codified at 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 107-120 (West 1977 & Supp. 1991).
40. 17 U.S.C. § 117(1) (1988). Before a program can be used, it is almost always neces-
sary to copy the program into the computer's internal random access memory. See SAJJAN G.
SHIVA, COMPUTER DESIGN AND ARCHITECTURE 216 (2d ed. 1991).
41. 17 U.S.C. § 117(2) (1988). This subsection states that copies may be made for "archi-
val purposes only and [only if] all archival copies are destroyed in the event that continued
possession of the computer program should cease to be rightful."
42. See UNITED STATES NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF
COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL REPORT 13 (1979). For a thorough discussion of § 117, see
John M. Conely & Vance F. Brown, Revisiting § 117 of the Copyright Act.- An Economic Ap-
proach, 7 COMPUTER LAW. 1 (1990).
43. 17 U.S.C.A. § 109. Although the scope of this Note is limited to the first sale doctrine
as it relates to the distribution right, the Software Act also contains an amendment that applies
the first sale doctrine to the public performance and display rights for coin-operated electronic
video games. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 803, 104 Stat. 5089,
5135 (codified at 17 U.S.C.A. § 109(e)). In addition, 17 U.S.C.A. § 109(c) arguably applies the
first sale doctrine to the public display right. See supra note 35 for a definition of the public
display right.
Until the enactment of § 109(e), it was generally believed that the first sale doctrine did not
apply to the public performance right. Red Baron-Franklin Park, Inc. v. Taito Corp., 883
F.2d 275, 278 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that video games could not be operated in an arcade
without the permission of copyright owner), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 869 (1990); MELVILLE B.
NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.12[D] (1990). But see Universal
Film Mfg. Co. v. Copperman, 218 F. 390 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 235 U.S. 704 (1914). Section
109(c) legislatively reversed the Fourth Circuit's holding in Red Baron. Congress passed
§ 109(e) after hearing testimony from the owner of a Red Baron amusement center about how
Japanese manufacturers were using United States copyright law to prevent the "parallel im-
port" of video game circuit boards and, thereby, charging a higher price for the game units.
House Software Hearing, supra note 1, at 127-29 (statement of William A. Beckham on behalf
of the American Operators for Equal Treatment). It is questionable whether this amendment
was designed after balancing the interests of promoting development in coin-operated video
games against the availability of these games to the public-the copyright balance--or whether
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trine permits the lawful owner of a particular copy of a copyrighted work to
"sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy" without the permis-
sion of the copyright owner.' The "privileges" granted in § 109, however,
extend only to persons who have lawfully acquired title to the particular
the amendment was simply designed to benefit domestic operators at the expense of foreign
developers.
The scope of this Note has been limited to the first sale doctrine's limitation on the distribu-
tion right because the Software Act's amendment to the public display and public performance
rights is rather insignificant. In fact, the phrase "first sale doctrine" is normally used only to
refer to the limit on the distribution right.
44. Section 109 currently states, in pertinent part, that:
(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of. section 106(3), the owner of a particular
copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by
such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or other-
wise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord.
(b)(l)(A) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a), unless authorized by
the owners of copyright in the sound recording or the owner of copyright in a com-
puter program (including any tape, disk, or medium embodying such program), and
in the case of a sound recording in the musical works embodied therein, neither the
owner of a particular phonorecord nor any person in possession of a particular copy
of computer program (including any tape, disk, or medium embodying such pro-
gram) may, for the purposes of direct or non-direct commercial advantage, dispose
of, or authorize the disposal of, the possession of that phonorecord or computer pro-
gram (including any tape, disk, or medium embodying such program) by rental,
lease, or lending, or by any other act or practice in the nature of rental, lease, or
lending. Nothing in the preceding sentence shall apply to the rental, lease, or lending
of a phonorecord for nonprofit purposes by a nonprofit library or nonprofit educa-
tional institution. The transfer of possession of a lawfully made copy of a computer
program by a nonprofit educational institution to another nonprofit educational insti-
tution or to faculty, staff, and students does not constitute rental, lease, or lending for
direct or indirect commercial purposes under this subsection.
(B) This subsection does not apply to-
(i) a computer program which is embodied in a machine or product and
which cannot be copied during the ordinary operation or use of the machine or prod-
uct; or
(ii) a computer program embodied in or used in conjunction with a lim-
ited purpose computer that is designed for playing video games and may be designed
for other purposes.
(2)(A) Nothing in this subsection shall apply to the lending of a computer program
for nonprofit purposes by a nonprofit library, if each copy of a computer program
which is lent by such library has affixed to the packaging containing the program a
warning of copyright in accordance with requirements that the Register of Copy-
rights shall prescribe by regulation.
(4) Any person who distributes a phonorecord or copy of a computer program
(including any tape, disk, or other medium embodying such program) in violation of
paragraph (1) is an infringer of copyright under section 501 of this title and is subject
to the remedies set forth in sections 502, 503, 504, 505 and 509 ....
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copy of the work, and not to persons who acquire possession by illegal
means or by rental, lease or lending. 45 The doctrine "is an extension of the
principle that ownership of the material object is distinct from ownership of
the copyright in this material,"'  and can be traced to the common law's
contempt for restraints on alienation of property.47
The exclusive distribution right establishes a copyright owner's right to
first publication of particular copies of his works.4 Like the other four
rights, the distribution right enables copyright owners to prevent public dis-
semination of individual copies for which they have not received compensa-
tion.49 It allows them to prevent unauthorized distributions of copies
regardless of whether they could sue potential distributors for violating the
duplication, derivation, public display or public performance rights.5 0 The
first sale doctrine extinguishes the distribution right once the copyright
owner receives compensation for a copy because a guaranteed one-time com-
pensation per copy is deemed by the copyright law to provide sufficient in-
centive to spur creation. There is, therefore, no reason to allow the
(d) The privileges prescribed by subsections (a) and (c) do not, unless authorized
by the copyright owner, extend to any person who has acquired possession of the
copy or phonorecord from the copyright owner, by rental, lease, loan, or otherwise,
without acquiring ownership of it.
17 U.S.C.A. § 109.
45. 17 U.S.C.A. § 109(d) (West Supp. 1991). See infra text accompanying notes 60-73 for
a discussion of when title in a particular copyrighted work has changed hands for first sale
doctrine purposes.
46. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Redd Home, Inc., 749 F.2d 154, 159 (3d Cir. 1984).
This principle is codified at 17 U.S.C. § 202 (1988); see supra notes 36-38 and accompanying
text.
47. See Sebastian Int'l, Inc. v. Consumer Contacts (PTY) Ltd., 847 F.2d 1093, 1096 (3d
Cir. 1988) (discussing the first sale doctrine in the course of denying copyright owner's request
for an injunction to prevent sale of hair care products with copyrighted labels because copy-
right owner sold the products); H.R. REP. No. 987, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1984), reprinted in
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2898, 2899 (citing Zechariah Chafee, Equitable Servitude on Chattels, 41
HARV. L. REV. 945, 962 (1928)).
48. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 552 (1985)
("'Under [§ 106(3)] the copyright owner would have the right to control the first public distri-
bution of an authorized copy.., of his work.' "(omission in original) (quoting H.R. REP. No.
1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 62 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5675)).
49. NIMMER, supra note 43, § 8.12[A] (discussing the rationale behind the first sale
doctrine).
50. For example, if newly printed copies of a book were wrongfully obtained by a book
dealer before they were ever sold, the copyright law would not provide the copyright owner
with any cause of action against the book dealer if the dealer simply stored the books in a
warehouse. If the book dealer attempted to distribute the books, however, the copyright
owner could prevent him from so doing by asserting his exclusive distribution right regardless
of the fact that the copies had been made legally.
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copyright owner to control what the purchaser and future owners do with
the work.5 1
C. Application of the First Sale Doctrine
A good way to examine the first sale doctrine is to look at how courts have
applied it. Harrison v. Maynard, Merrill & Co.52 and Bobbs-Merrill Co. v.
Straus53 were two early first sale doctrine cases. The copyright statutes in
effect at the time of these decisions gave copyright owners the "sole right of
vending" 5 4 without making an exception for lawfully obtained individual
copies. In Harrison, the Second Circuit held that the copyright law could
not be used to prevent the resale of burned books that had been sold by the
copyright owner, even though the sales contract stipulated that the books
were only to be used as paper stock,55 because the vending right had ended
with the first sale of the books.5 6 In Bobbs-Merrill, the leading first sale
doctrine case, the plaintiff sued R.H. Macy & Company for copyright in-
fringement after the defendant sold, for eighty-nine cents, a book containing
a printed notice specifying that any sale of the book for less than one dollar
would be treated as a copyright infringement.5 7 The Court stated that the
51. C.M. Paula Co. v. Logan, 355 F. Supp. 189, 191 (N.D. Tex. 1973); Blazon, Inc. v.
DeLuxe Game Corp., 268 F. Supp. 416, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); NiMMER, supra note 43,
§ 8.12[A]. As the C.M. Paula court stated, after the first sale
the right to prevent unauthorized vending ... is not so much a supplement to the
intangible copyright, but is rather primarily a device for controlling the disposition of
the tangible personal property which embodies the copyrighted work. Therefore,
[after the first sale,] the policy favoring a copyright monopoly for authors gives way
to the policy opposing restraints of trade and restraints on alienation.
355 F. Supp. at 191. Thus, the first sale doctrine extinguishes the distribution right once the
copyright owner " 'has received his reward.' " Sebastian Int'l, 847 F.2d at 1097 (quoting
Burke & Van Heusen, Inc. v. Arrow Drug, Inc., 233 F. Supp. 881, 884 (E.D. Pa. 1964)); see
infra notes 60-73 and accompanying text.
52. 61 F. 689 (2d Cir. 1894).
53. 210 U.S. 339 (1908).
54. The modem distribution right, 17 U.S.C. § 106(c) (1988), previously was defined in
the copyright statutes as the right of "vending."
55. Harrison, 61 F. at 689-90.
56. Id. at 691. The court found that "[tihe exclusive right to vend the particular copy no
longer remains in the owner of the copyright by the copyright statutes." However, in making
the determination the court did not cite to or analyze any particular section of the applicable
statutes. Id.
As the court noted, the plaintiff may have had a remedy in contract. Id. However, because
title passed hands a number of times, it was not clear whether the other party to the contract
could be found or brought into court. The software copyright owners lobbied for passage of
the Software Act because they faced a similar problem in that it was very difficult to prevent
rentals through contract due to the fact that there are multiple parties in the software distribu-
tion chain. See infra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
57. Bobbs-Merrill, 210 U.S. at 341-42.
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copyright statute's main purpose was to give copyright owners the right to
sell multiple copies of their works. Thus, the Court held that the retailer
was not liable for infringing the plaintiff's right to vend because the right to
vend only encompassed the right to make the initial sale, and not the right to
place restrictions on future sales.5" The first sale doctrine was codified a year
after Bobbs-Merrill in section 41 of the Copyright Act of 1909.- 9
The first sale doctrine does not necessarily require an actual sale of a copy-
righted work. For instance, the doctrine may take effect when the copyright
owner gives away the work' or transfers the work in a court-compelled
assignment.6 On the other hand, the lawful possession of a copyrighted
work by a party other than the copyright owner does not in itself automati-
cally trigger the first sale doctrine-a copyright owner may transfer posses-
sion to a bailee, for example, without extinguishing his distribution right.62
Rather, because the rationale behind the exclusive right to distribute is to
guarantee compensation, a first sale will be deemed to have occurred when
another party obtains title in a transaction where the copyright owner trans-
fers title and receives compensation for his work. 63 This principle was ap-
plied in Platt & Munk Co. v. Republic Graphics, Inc.," where the copyright
owner contracted with the defendant to build copyrighted toys but refused
to take delivery or pay for them because of alleged defects. 65 Even though
the manufacturer had legal title, the Second Circuit upheld an injunction
barring the manufacturer from selling the toys and rejected the manufac-
turer's argument that, under the first sale doctrine, it had the right to dis-
tribute the works because it had obtained lawful possession.66
58. Id. at 351. Because copyright protection was found to be wholly statutory, the Court
based its holding solely upon its interpretation of the copyright statute. Id. at 346. The
Court's opinion stated: "To add to the right of exclusive sale the authority to control all future
retail sales . . . would give a right not included in the statute, and, in our view, extend its
operation, by construction, beyond its meaning .... " Id. at 351.
59. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 41, 35 Stat. 1075, 1084 (1909). Section 41 stated
that "nothing in this Act shall be deemed to forbid, prevent or restrict the transfer of any copy
of a copyrighted work the possession of which has been lawfully obtained." The Copyright
Revision Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541, replaced section 41 with 17 U.S.C.
§ 109, the current codification of the first sale doctrine.
60. See, e.g., Walt Disney Prods. v. Basmajian, 600 F. Supp. 439, 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(denying preliminary injunction to prevent art work from being sold by defendant because the
copyright owner's right to prevent distribution had been extinguished when the art work was
given to the defendant).
61. Platt & Munk Co. v. Republic Graphics, Inc., 315 F.2d 847, 854 (2d Cir. 1963).
62. Id. at 851.
63. See 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 5.6.l.b (1989); Platt, 315 F.2d at 854.
64. 315 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1963).
65. Id. at 849.
66. Id. at 851. Judge Friendly stated that the issue in these type of cases is " 'whether or
not there had been such a disposition of the article that it may fairly be said that the patentee
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A related issue arising under the first sale doctrine is whether title has
transferred-and thus whether the doctrine takes effect-in a transaction
that the parties have called a licensing.67 In United States v. Wise,68 for
example, Wise appealed his criminal conviction for violating the exclusive
right to distribute copyrighted films. He claimed that the films he received
could have been sold by the studios, in which case the studios' exclusive
right to distribute would have been extinguished.69 The normal way films
left the possession of the studios was by being "licensed" for exhibition,
"lent" to individuals or sold as scrap to salvage companies.7" The question
before the court was whether the first sale doctrine was applicable because
the license or loan agreements were really sales.7 ' After examining the li-
cense and loan agreements for evidence that title had changed hands, the
court found that a few of the films which had been "licensed" and "lent"
actually had been sold, but it affirmed Wise's conviction as to the other,
unsold films.72 The characterization of the underlying transaction is impor-
tant to the issue of software rental because software publishers try to charac-
terize most consumer distributions of software as licensing arrangements
through the use of controversial contracts that consumers "accept" by open-
ing the boxes in which the software is packaged.73
D. Exemptions to the First Sale Doctrine: The Record Rental
Amendment of 1984 and the Attempt at Retaining
Video Rental Rights
Section 109(b)(1)(A) of the copyright law exempts record rental from the
first sale doctrine by specifically preserving the right of the owner of a copy-
right in a sound recording to prevent the rental of a phonorecord containing
that recording. 74 The Record Rental Amendment of 1984 7 added this pro-
[or copyright proprietor] has received his reward for the use of the article.'" Id. at 854 (altera-
tion in original) (quoting United States v. Maisonette Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 278 (1942)).
67. See, e.g., United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 929
(1977); Data Prods. Inc. v. Repart, Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) 26,723 (D. Kan. Nov. 29,
1990) (refusing to grant summary judgment on first sale doctrine grounds because it was un-
clear whether the copyrighted software in question had been sold or licensed).
68. 550 F.2d 1180 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 929 (1977).
69. Id. at 1190-92. It was not determined exactly how the films had gone from possession
of the motion picture studios who made them into Wise's possession. See id. at 1884-85.
70. Id. at 1184.
71. Id. at 1188. The copies of those films sold to the salvage companies were unviewable.
Id. at 1193.
72. Id. at 1194.
73. See infra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
74. 17 U.S.C.A. § 109(b)(l)(A) (West Supp. 1991).
75. Pub. L. No. 98-450, 98 Stat. 1727 (1984).
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vision to the copyright law because Congress was concerned that records
were usually rented for the purpose of illegal duplication 76 and that the reve-
nues lost by such duplication would have a serious effect on the recording
industry. 77 A similar amendment was contemporaneously considered to al-
low owners of copyrights in motion pictures recorded on video cassette tapes
to prevent the rental of such tapes.7 ' The failure of the motion picture in-
dustry to secure passage of the Consumer Sales-Video Rental Amendment
was not a total loss to film producers, however, because revenues from video
cassette rentals are today a major source of their income.79
In considering the Software Act, Congress had to determine whether
software rentals are more analogous to record rentals, which were deter-
mined to be harmful, or to video cassette rentals, which provide the movie
industry with handsome profits. The relevant distinctions between records,
video cassettes and software are the difficulty of duplication and the degree
to which consumers desire to own a permanent copy. Illegal duplication
from rented copies of copyrighted works increases as copying becomes easier
and as consumers' interest in keeping copies of the rented work increases.
The Record Rental Amendment of 1984 was enacted because records can be
copied cheaply, easily and cleanly 0 and because there is a strong incentive
76. House Audio and Video Hearings, supra note 11, at 3 (statement of Stanley Gortikov,
president of the Recording Industry Association of America). Record rental dealer advertise-
ments as evidence that record renters were really interested in copying the records, some of
which declared: "Rent your favorite album for $2.50 ... and get an Ampex cassette free," id.
(omission in original), "Never, ever buy another record," id., and "SAVE MONEY. Rent any
LP or 45. Take it home, put it on tape and return it." Id. at 28.
77. Recording industry executive Stanley Gortikov stated his concern that "rental shops
merely feed off the talent and investments of others, jeopardizing jobs, careers, and music
itself." Id. at 4.
78. H.R. 1029, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1983), reprinted in House Audio and Video Hearings,
supra note 11, at 729; S. 33, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), reprinted in Senate Audio and Video
Hearings, supra note 11, at 5.
79. According to the United States Commerce Department, "[flilm company revenues
from video business has for years surpassed revenue from domestic theatrical exhibitions."
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, 1991 U.S. INDUSTRIAL OUTLOOK 32-5
(1991). In his opening remarks at the House hearings on the Software Act, Chairman Kas-
tenmeier recounted a recent statement made by Motion Picture Association of America Presi-
dent Jack Valenti: "'So when I fetch from my memory that long time ago when I first met a
VCR, I can only tell you if I thought I was going to be sick then, I am now able to say that I
am just fine.'" House Software Hearing, supra note 1, at 2.
80. See 135 CONG. REC. S568 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1989) (statement of Sen. Hatch). In fact,
the record industry was pushing for the Record Rental Act in 1984 because the predicted
proliferation of inexpensive recording equipment and digital compact discs would allow rent-
ers to make very high quality duplicates. H.R. REP. No. 987, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 n.6
(1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2898, 2899. The record industry is again being chal-
lenged by an advancement in consumer stereo equipment technology with the arrival of digital
audio recording, which allows for the making of virtually identical copies. See Owen C.B.
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to duplicate in order to enjoy repeated listenings of records."1 In the case of
video cassette tapes, on the other hand, Congress felt that renters would
have no desire to own their own copy of the rented movies.8 2 Based on these
criteria, software appears to present a better case than records for giving
copyright owners rental rights. Software can be duplicated perfectly and
cheaply in a short time, 3 and, as will be discussed below, there is support for
the claim that software is only useful if owned on a permanent basis.8 4
II. OTHER AVENUES TO PREVENT COPYING OF RENTED SOFTWARE
Although the first sale doctrine prevented software manufacturers from
using their copyrights to prohibit rental, other legal and non-legal methods
were available for preventing duplication of rented software. Unfortunately,
these measures were not effective. For example, available technology per-
mits the installation of "copy-protection devices" in a computer program,
making duplication by ordinary means impossible.85 This solution, how-
ever, does not work in practice for two reasons. First, programs are legally
available to render copy-protection devices ineffective. 86 Second, programs
Hughes, DigitalAudio Recording: A Look at Proposed Legislation, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 1, 1991, at 1.
See generally Copyright Issues Presented by Digital Audio Tape: Joint Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary and the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Admin. of Justice of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1987).
81. One piece of evidence presented at the House hearings was a survey made of record
renters in Japan which showed that over 97% of them taped the records they rented. House
Audio and Video Hearings, supra note 11, at 33 (joint statement by music and recording indus-
try associations). The situation United States copyright owners face in Japan appears to be
improving because a new law recently took effect in Japan that allows foreign copyright own-
ers the right to prohibit rental of CD's for one year after they are issued, even though Japanese
copyright owners do not have that right. T.R. Reid, End of the One-Night Disk?, WASH.
POST, Jan. 4, 1992, at Cl.
82. See House Audio and Video Hearings, supra note 11, at 238 (statement of economist
Nina W. Cornell). People usually do not watch movies repeatedly, as is evidenced by the
popularity of video cassette rental in contrast to the relative unpopularity of video cassettes
sales. Id. at 238-39.
83. See 1989 Senate Software Hearings, supra note 12, at 68 (statement of Bruce Kennedy,
Chair of the Copyright Committee, American Association of Libraries) ("With some justice,
the creators of computer programs state a case that theirs is the only type of copyrighted work
that can be easily, quickly, totally and perfectly copied by an infringer."); see also supra note
12-13.
84. See infra notes 109-17 and accompanying text.
85. James A. Eidelman & Carol R. Shepherd, Living Among Pirates. Practical Strategies
to Protect Computer Software, 65 MICH. B.J. 284, 285 (1984).
86. The sale of anti-copy-protection programs does not constitute a copyright violation
because such programs may be used in the making of archivial copies of software, which them-
selves are specifically legal under 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1988). Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd.,
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containing copy-protection devices are not as marketable due to the con-
sumer's desire to make duplicate copies.8 7
One legal remedy available to software copyright owners would be to sue
rental dealers under the copyright theory of contributory infringement.
Under the doctrine of contributory infringement, a party who aids in a copy-
right infringement can be held liable along with the actual infringer."8
Courts have defined contributory infringement as inducing, causing or mate-
rially contributing to copyright infringement by another party where there is
or should have been knowledge of the infringement.8 9 Thus, if the copyright
owner can prove that the rental dealer knew or should have known that the
renter intended to illegally duplicate a program, the dealer can be sued for
contributory infringement. Proving that the dealer actually knew of the in-
tent to duplicate involves proving the potentially difficult factual issue of the
dealer's knowledge in each specific case-an especially difficult problem as-
suming that most rental dealers would not make any effort to inquire into
renters' intentions. It would be easier to infer that dealers should have
known that renters will copy the programs given the evidence that many
renters do copy the programs. In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City
Studios,9 ° however, the United States Supreme Court held that the sale of a
product that can be used to duplicate copyrighted works is not a contribu-
tory infringement if the product serves a substantial non-infringing purpose,
which the Court defined as frequent use for a "legitimate, unobjectionable
purpose." 9 ' Because there arguably are substantial uses for rented software
847 F.2d 255, 266-67 (5th Cir. 1988). See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text for a
discussion of § 117.
87. See STEWART BRAND, THE MEDIA LAB 202 (1987) (discussing how market pressure
forced software developers to discontinue copy protection devices); Eidelman & Shepherd,
supra note 85, at 285.
Other disadvantages of anti-piracy devices are that they may decrease program performance
and add to production costs. See Charles P. Kootz, Software Piracy Now Costs Industry Bil-
lions, LAN TIMES, Mar. 18, 1991, at 75, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, TRDTEC File
(discussing hardware security keys).
88. While the copyright statutes do not explicitly establish liability for contributory in-
fringement, it has been judicially accepted. Southern Miss. Planning & Dev. Dist., Inc. v.
Robertson, 660 F. Supp. 1057, 1063 (S.D. Miss. 1986).
89. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 434-35 (1984);
Southern Miss. Planning, 660 F. Supp. at 1062; Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Art-
ists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971).
90. 464 U.S. at 442.
91. Id.; see also Cable/Home Comm. Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc. 902 F.2d 829, 846
(11th Cir. 1990); Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 261 (5th Cir. 1988)
(holding that the developer of a program that defeats copy-protection devices was not liable for
contributory infringement because the program could be used to make legal copies). Sony
involved a suit brought by two television studios against the manufacturer and marketer of
video tape recorder machines and a user of those machines. Sony, 464 U.S. at 419-20. The
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other than illegal duplication,9 2 the act of renting software without actual
knowledge that the renter intended to infringe would probably not suffice to
establish liability for contributory infringement.
Although the first sale doctrine prevents copyright owners from asserting
their copyright interest after a work is sold, they still may place limits on a
work's distribution through the contract under which they furnish the
work. 93 Alternatively, the first sale doctrine may be avoided altogether and
the distribution right preserved by structuring the transaction as one of li-
cense rather than sale.94 The arrangement of license and contract agree-
ments is complicated when dealing with mass-marketed software because
there may be no direct contact, and hence no privity of contract, between the
manufacturer and the rental dealer.9 5 Software developers assert that they
retain the title to programs, and thus preserve the distribution right for those
programs, by including licensing agreements on the program's containers
stating that they bind the purchaser to the agreement when the box is
opened.96 These agreements are of questionable validity and have been chal-
lenged as adhesion contracts because they are normally not read until the
program has been taken home and is about to be used.97 The Software Act
studios alleged that the makers of the machines contributorily infringed their copyrights by
making it possible for purchasers of the machines to copy television programs, but the Court
rejected their arguments. Id. at 420-21. It found that the video tape recorders were capable of
at least two non-infringing uses: taping programs for the purpose of viewing them at a more
convenient time, and taping programs with the authorization of the copyright owner. Id. at
445-55. The Court relied on a Los Angeles television guide which listed 58% of the programs
as being authorized for home taping and upon the testimony of copyright owners, including
producer Fred Rogers. Id. at 445, n.27 (quoting Mr. Rogers as saying, "I think it is a real
service to families to be able to record such programs and show them at appropriate times").
92. See infra text accompanying notes 109-17.
93. Even in the leading first sale doctrine case, Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339
(1908), the Court expressed willingness to uphold a valid contract claim despite the applicabil-
ity of the first sale doctrine. Id. at 350.
94. See Page M. Kaufman, Note, The Enforceability of State "Shrink- Wrap" License Stat-
utes In Light of Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd., 74 CORNELL L. REV. 222, 234-35
(1988). Under a licensing arrangement, the software developer retains title to the software and
the first sale doctrine never extinguishes the copyright owner's distribution right because the
doctrine applies only after the title has lawfully changed hands. 17 U.S.C.A. § 109(d) (West
Supp. 1991); see Stein and Day, Inc. v. Red Letter Books, Inc., 1984 Copyright L. Dec. (CCH)
25,728 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (finding that the first sale doctrine did not apply where defendant
had possession of books but was not given permission to sell them).
95. Eidelman & Shepherd, supra note 85, at 284; Ryan, supra note 15, at 2108.
96. Eidelman & Shepherd, supra note 85, at 287-88. The agreements are known as
"shrink-wrap" because they normally specify that assent is manifested by the removal of the
plastic shrink-wrap coating that encases the box. Deborah Kemp, Mass Marketed Software:
The Legality of the Form License Agreement, 48 LA. L. REV. 87 (1987).
97. See Ryan, supra note 15; Richard H. Stem, Shrink- Wrap Licenses of Mass Marketed
Software.- Enforceable Contracts or Whistling in the Dark?, 11 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH.
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alleviates the need to use either a contract or other method to prevent rental
by maintaining the copyright owner's distribution right regardless of
whether the transaction constitutes a sale.
III. THE SOFTWARE ACT AND FUTURE LIMITS ON THE FIRST SALE
DOCTRINE: BALANCING THE COSTS AND BENEFITS
The Software Act amended the copyright law to exempt rentals of com-
puter software, like sound recordings, from the first sale doctrine. 98 Section
L.J. 51 (1985); Amelia H. Boss et al., Scope of the Uniform Commercial Code: Advances in
Technology and Survey of Computer Contracting Cases, 44 Bus. LAW. 1671, 1680-81 (stating
that "there is serious question whether an 'acceptance' and contract formation ... can arise
from the licensee's opening the plastic"); Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, 'Shrink-Wrap'
Licenses and Implied Warranties, N.Y. L.J., March 22, 1991, at 3 ("There is a genuine debate
in the academic community concerning the enforceability of shrink-wrap licenses.").
There have been very few cases dealing with shrink-wrap licenses. In the most recent case,
decided after the enactment of the Software Act, the Third Circuit held that the application of
a warranty provision in a shrink-wrap license was invalid under article 2 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code as it was applied to a value-added retailer with whom the plaintiff had a prior
agreement. Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Technology, 939 F.2d 91, 105-06 (3d Cir.
1991). To clear up questions regarding their enforceability, a few states passed statutes that
declared shrink-wrap agreements to be enforceable. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 29, 801-808
(1988), repealed by P.A. 85-254, § 1 (1988), P.A. 85-614, § 1 (1988); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 51:1961-1966 (West 1987). The enforceability of these statutes themselves has been ques-
tioned, however, because of possible preemption by the federal copyright law. See Vault Corp.
v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988); Kaufman, supra note 94; Kemp, supra
note 96. In Vault, the Fifth Circuit held invalid sections of a Louisiana license statute that
permitted copyright owners to restrict the right to copy a program through an included license
agreement because Louisiana's License Act " 'touches upon an area' of federal copyright law."
847 F.2d at 270. The court found that § 117 of the federal copyright law was a specific state-
ment by Congress on the subject of software duplication. Id. at 270. See supra notes 40-42
and accompanying text for a discussion of § 117.
98. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 801-805, 104 Stat. 5089,
5134 (codified at 17 U.S.C.A. § 109(b)-(d) (West Supp. 1991)). For the relevant text of § 109,
see supra note 44. The owner of a particular copy of a phonorecord has been unable to rent
that copy without the permission of the copyright owner since the enactment of the Record
Rental Amendment of 1984. Pub. L. No. 98-450, 98 Stat. 1727 (codified at 17 U.S.C.A.
§ 109(b)). For a discussion of the Record Rental Amendment of 1984, see supra text accompa-
nying notes 75-81.
The Software Act also contained a provision authorizing the copyright office to establish a
depository for computer "shareware" at the Library of Congress, Judicial Improvements Act
of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 805, 104 Stat. 5089, 5136 (1990), and a provision that allows
the owners of certain legally purchased coin-operated computer video games to operate those
games in arcades without obtaining the permission of the owners of the software copyrights.
Id., § 803, 104 Stat. at 5135; see H.R. REP. No. 735, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1990), reprinted
in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6940. For a discussion of the later provision, see supra note 43.
"Shareware" is copyrighted software which the copyright owner allows the public to dupli-
cate and test without charge. If someone decides that they want to use the program, they are
obligated to send the copyright owner a small fee. See R. Dale Hobart et al., Teaching Com-
puter Literacy with Freeware and Shareware, T H E JOURNAL, May, 1988, at 78, 80.
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109(b)(1)(A) now provides that a copy of a computer program may not be
commercially rented, leased or lent without authorization of the copyright
owner.9 9 Congress created exemptions from the Software Act's realignment
of rental rights for several types of rentals,"°° some of which were more
clearly needed than others.' 1 Congress also limited the duration of the
Software Act by including a termination or "sunset" provision which speci-
fies that the Act will not apply to rentals after 19 October 1997.102
The Software Act was motivated by a desire to increase the sale of
software, and hence increase the incentive to create new software, by curbing
the duplication of rented software.'o 3 Because the copyright law should pro-
99. 17 U.S.C.A. § 109(b)(l)(a).
Language was added to the Act applying it to practices "in the nature of rental, lease and
lending" in an attempt to prevent dealers from doing an end-run around the Software Act by
"selling" programs with the understanding that the programs could be returned after paying a
relatively substantial restocking fee. See 136 CONG. REC. H13,315 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990)
(statement of Rep. Fish); cf H.R. REP. No. 987, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1984), reprinted in
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2898, 2901 (discussing identical language in the Record Rental Amend-
ment). Some software retailers allow purchasers to return software even if the box has been
opened. See Carla Lazzareschi, The Egghead Balancing Act, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 22, 1989, pt.
IV, at 1, 5. The largest software retailer, Egghead Software, has a "no-questions-asked" return
policy. Id. Although Egghead does not "rent" software, a well-publicized "no-questions-
asked" campaign could facilitate piracy just as well as would rentals. Thus, Egghead Software
and other retailers may be undermining the effectiveness of the Act even though they are just
as interested as the software developers in seeing that more software is sold.
100. 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 109(b)(1)(A), (b)(l)(B)(i), (b)(1)(B)(ii), (b)(2)(A).
101. See infra notes 122-42 and accompanying text for a further discussion of these
exemptions.
102. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, § 804, 104 Stat. at 5136. This provision theoreti-
cally forces Congress to re-examine the situation at that time. Cf H.R. REP. No. 987, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2898, 2903 (discussing a similar
sunset provision in the Record Rental Amendment of 1984).
A second limitation placed on the Act's effective dates specifies that the Act does not affect
rental rights for software acquired before the Act was enacted. § 804, 104 Stat. at 5136. Be-
cause the right to rent software acquired under the pre-Software Act first sale doctrine belongs
to the owner of the individual copy of that software, some felt that the prospective application
of the Act would violate the United States Constitution's prohibition on the taking of property
without just compensation. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see H.R. REP. No. 735, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess, 8 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6939; 1989 Senate Software Hearings,
supra note 12, at 107 (letter submitted by Assistant United States Attorney General Carol T.
Crawford) (citing Roth v. Pritkin, 710 F.2d 934, 939 (2d Cir.) (stating that copyrights are
protected by the just compensation clause), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 961 (1983))). Similar limita-
tions were included in the Record Rental Amendment of 1984. § 4, 98 Stat. at 1728; Act of
Nov. 5, 1988, § 1, Pub. L. No. 100-617, 102 Stat. 3194 (extending the Record Rental Amend-
ment's sunset date until 4 October 1997).
103. See 136 CONG. REC. S16,310 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1990) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch)
(predicting that illegal duplication of rented software would devastate the software industry).
Software rentals encourage copyright infringement and give infringers relatively inexpensive
and easy access to programs from which they can make copies. See supra notes 14-15 and
accompanying text.
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mote the public benefit, the decision to realign software rental rights should
be based on considerations of whether the public will ultimately benefit by
such a change."° Thus, the increased incentive to create must be balanced
against the benefit that the public derives from rentals. The following analy-
sis of the Software Act examines three categories of rentals: the retail rent-
als"05 that Congress meant the Act to affect, the rentals that were explicitly
left unaffected by the Act, and the rental transactions that the Act may unin-
tentionally affect. A fourth section discusses the future of the first sale doc-
trine in the face of rapidly changing technology.
A. The Costs and Benefits of Retail Rental
At present, little evidence exists dealing with the effect of retail rental on
the software industry or with the usefulness to society of retail software
rental. 106 One reason for the lack of evidence is the fact that the rental in-
In addition to combatting the problem of domestic software duplication, a further argument
for the Software Act was that it would enable software manufacturers to obtain better interna-
tional protection of software. House Software Hearing, supra note 1, at 40 (statement of Ralph
Oman, Register of Copyrights). International software duplication is of great concern to
United States copyright owners. See 136 CONG. REC. E3,443 (1990) (statement of Rep. Rich-
ard Gephardt) (discussing copying of United States produced software in Japan). President
Reagan stated that the software industry lost up to $4 billion in 1986 because other countries
did not protect copyrights to the same extent as did the United States. He made these remarks
while signing the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, which amended the copy-
right law to allow United States copyright owners protection under the most extensive interna-
tional copyright agreement. Chuck Conconi, Personalities, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 1988, at E3;
see Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 101-568, 102 Stat. 2853
(1988); S. REP. No. 352, 100th Cong., 2d. Sess. 2 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3706,
3707. It is unclear to what extent the Software Act improves the outlook for international
protection of United States software. The Berne Convention already requires signatories to
give foreign copyrighted material the same protection given to their own works, and the Euro-
pean Economic Community's Directive on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs re-
quires member countries to give rental rights to copyright owners. House Software Hearing,
supra note I, at 40 (statement of Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights); see The Berne Conven-
tion for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 5(1), S. TREATY Doc. No. 27, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1986); Council Directive No. 91/250, art. 4(c), 1991 O.J. (L 122) 42, 44.
But cf. supra note 81 (discussing Japan's grant of the rental right to United States sound- re-
cording copyright owners).
104. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
105. This Note uses the phrase "retail rentals" to refer to short-term rentals by merchants
who rent only finished software products.
106. Although supportive of the Software Act, Register of Copyrights Ralph Oman
cautioned:
[T]here may be reasonable differences of opinion on whether there is present or im-
minent danger of serious injury to the legitimate interests of copyright holders in
computer programs posed by lending operations, now legitimate under the first sale
doctrine. There is not much direct experience for us to consider. We have few hard
facts.
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dustry never became very large.'17 Opponents of giving software copyright
owners the rental right have offered a number of possible legitimate reasons
for retail software rental. Software industry spokesmen, however, dismiss
these reasons and argue that the real reason for retail renting is to illegally
duplicate the rented programs.'0 8 The need for temporary rentals is debata-
ble, and neither side can be dismissed without evidence from actual market
studies.
One proposed legitimate reason for retail software rental is the need to test
programs before purchasing them." Program testing is important because
of high purchase prices 10 and because of the wide choice of available prod-
ucts." '1 Software publishers dismiss retail renting of software for testing
purposes as impractical due to relatively high rental fees." 2 Further, they
contend that home testing is unnecessary because retailers will often allow
customers to test programs in the store.' 13 Some observers believe, however,
House Software Hearing, supra note 1, at 34.
Some issues which could be studied are the amount of software rented, the frequency with
which rented software is later purchased, and the uses to which rented software is put.
107. H.R. REP. No. 735, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6935, 6939; see House Software Hearing, supra note 1, at 32 (statement of Ralph Oman, Regis-
ter of Copyrights). The small size of the rental industry should not be taken as evidence of its
potential because growth of the rental industry may have been retarded by the threat that the
Software Act would be passed and make it difficult for dealers to obtain rental rights. In the
House software rental hearings, however, Register of Copyrights Oman pointed out that,
although software producers claimed in 1984 that the rental industry was about to take off, "It
is now five years later, and rental firms have not proliferated as predicted." Id.
108. See,. e.g., House Software Hearing, supra note 1, at 48 (statement of R. Duff Thomp-
son, Vice President and General Counsel, WordPerfect Corp.).
109. At least one software dealer found that rental of software programs leads to sales
approximately 25% of the time. House Software Hearing, supra note 1, at 154.
110. The WordPerfect word processing program, for example, currently sells for about
$250. Blaine Harden, Polish Copyright Pirates Peril U.S. Trade Ties, WASH. PosT, Oct. 21,
1991, at AI, A14.
111. See Leonard Fisher, Piracy Threatens Software Rentals, CRAIN'S CHICAGO Bus., June
19, 1989, at T8; Kathleen Melymuka, Software Rental Saves Unnecessary Purchases, Alterna-
tive to Buying Blind, PC WEEK, Sept. 1, 1987, at 131.
112. 1989 Senate Software Hearings, supra note 12, at 37 (statement of Heidi Roizen, Presi-
dent, Software Publishers Association). Rental costs can run as high as 25% of the sales price.
See Fisher, supra note 11; Melymuka, supra note 111; J. Michael Ruhl, Software Developers
Fire Broadside at 'Pirating' by Rental Operations, DEN. POST, Oct. 24, 1988, at C3.
113. 1989 Senate Software Hearings, supra note 12, at 37 (statement of Heidi Roizen, Presi-
dent, Software Publishers Association). One of the important attractions of the highly-suc-
cessful software retailing chain Egghead Software is that it allows customers to test programs
in the store or at home. Lazzareschi, supra note 99, at 5. For a discussion of the possibility
that such practices may facilitate software piracy, see supra note 99.
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that in-store testing is insufficient because consumers can only make in-
formed decisions by testing software on their own systems.114
Another possible use for rented software is to meet temporary needs.
Software developers argue that renting software for a short task is not feasi-
ble because it often takes a long time to become proficient enough to make
effective use of programs. 1 '5 In addition, software developers argue that the
real value of using a computer to do a task lies in the ability to reuse the
database that is generated; this can only be accomplished by repeated use of
the program.' 16 Even so, there are situations in which retail rental might
prove useful. For example, a businessman may need to develop a one-time
presentation or may wish to take an extra copy of a program being used in
his office along with him on a business trip." 7 Without market research, the
need to use software on a short term basis is unknown.
The extent to which illegal duplication of rented software decreases
software developers' profits also bears a closer examination. Even if every
renter illegally keeps a duplicate copy of the program that he rents,' 18 it is
not clear that he would have purchased the program had he been unable to
rent it. Because many programs are readily available, people intent on ille-
gally duplicating a program probably could get a copy from a source other
than a rental dealer.' 9 A person willing to violate the copyright law, but
not motivated enough to borrow a program from a friend or from their of-
fice, would most likely not be motivated enough to spend money to purchase
the program. 120
114. As one commentator analogized: "You may be able to try out a program at the retail
store on a strange computer with a fictitious workload, but would you really buy a Porsche
after driving it at 15 miles an hour on a quarter-mile of straight road?" Melymuka, supra note
11, at 131.
115. 1989 Senate Software Hearings, supra note 12, at 39 (statement of Heidi Roizen, Presi-
dent, Software Publishers Association).
116. Id.
117. House Software Hearing, supra note 1, at 80 (statement of Robert S. Bramson, Gen-
eral Patent and Technology Counsel, Unisys Corp.); id. at 138 (statement of Harry Manbeck,
Jr., Assistant Secretary and Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks).
118. Many programs are "installed" into the internal memory of a computer before use.
Thus, a copy of rented software will often be created inside a renter's computer and will. be
removed only if the renter is knowledgeable and honest enough to take the affirmative act of
erasing it.
119. House Software Hearing, supra note 1, at 100 (statement of Robert S. Bramson, Gen-
eral Patent and Technology Counsel, Unysis Corp.); id. at 157 (letter from Paul Aponte,
owner of a software rental store) (stating that "[m]ost software pirates get their programs off of
[electronic] bulletin boards").
120. Id. at 100 (statement of Robert S. Bramson, General Patent and Technology Counsel,
Unysis Corp.).
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While the software developers seem to have the stronger case, the evi-
dence is not conclusive. Congress, nonetheless, gave the developers the
power to prevent software rental without waiting for further evidence. Of
course, Congress cannot afford to make a detailed study every time it passes
a law. Concerns for legislative efficiency and the need for immediate action
may require action based on the evidence at its disposal. On the other hand,
political concerns should not substitute for sound copyright policy.'2 1
Copyright amendments should be designed to fulfill the purpose of the copy-
right law and, as with all legislation, should be drafted carefully to minimize
unintended effects. The influence of politics and the importance of caution
in regulating the fast-changing and pervasive area of software is illustrated
by the exemptions to the Act which Congress deemed necessary.
B. The Software Act's Exemptions: Special Cases, Special Interests and
Rental Prevention That Clearly Would Have Gone Too Far
The Software Act explicitly does not affect the application of the first sale
doctrine as it relates to lending of software for non-commercial purposes,' 22
lending of software by nonprofit libraries' 23 and educational institutions,'2 4
renting of certain video game software,'2 5 and renting of software that could
not ordinarily be copied in the normal use of the machine on which it is
run."' The reason for allowing lending for non-commercial purposes was
not stated in the legislative history of the Act. The exemption followed the
precedent set by the Record Rental Act of 1984, which contained exemp-
tions for non-commercial lending as well as for libraries and nonprofit edu-
cational institutions. 27
The library and educational institution exceptions were included in the
Software Act at the behest of libraries and schools because the lending of
software by these institutions was viewed as serving a "valuable public pur-
121. The influence of special interests on the development of copyright law is discussed by
Thomas P. Olson in his article The Iron Law Of Consensus: Congressional Responses to Pro-
posed Copyright Reforms Since the 1909 Act. 36 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 109 (1989). For further
evidence of the influence of politics on the Software Act, see supra note 43, and infra notes
128-38 and accompanying text.
122. 17 U.S.C.A. § 109(b)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1991).
123. Id. § 109(b)(2)(A).
124. Id. § 109(b)(l)(a).
125. Id. § 109(B)(1)(b)(ii).
126. Id. § 109(b)(l)(B)(i).
127. Record Rental Amendment of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-450, § 2, 98 Stat. 1727 (1984)
(codified at 17 U.S.C.A. § 109(b)(l)(A)); see H.R. REP. No. 987, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1984),
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2898, 2899 (stating simply that the Record Rental Amend-
ment does not apply to home taping).
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pose."' 28 Spokesmen for the libraries argued that there was no evidence that
copyrighted programs lent by libraries were duplicated, that there were legit-
imate uses of borrowed software, 129 and that the Software Act would pro-
hibit the lending of mixed media products that contain copyrighted
software. 130 Educational institutions feared that the Software Act would af-
fect their operation of computer laboratories and of outreach programs that
allow students and faculty to borrow software for evaluation and educational
purposes. 131 In fact, most lending by nonprofit libraries and schools would
probably be exempted under the Act's nonprofit exemption. 132 The only
justifiable reasons for these exemptions would be that Congress felt that
lending by these institutions was more socially valuable than lending by re-
tail rental dealers or that software rented from dealers more likely would be
illegally duplicated. The legislative record provides no evidence to support
either of these possibilities. Another explanation would be that Congress
was simply more responsive to the politically powerful library and education
lobbies than it was to the fledgling software rental industry.133
128. H.R. REP. No. 735, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6935, 6939; see 17 U.S.C.A. § 109(b)(2)(B) (suggesting that the exemption was added to allow
libraries "to fulfill their function"); 136 CONG. REC. H13,314 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (state-
ment of Rep. Fish) (stating that the educational institution exception was added "[a]t the
request of nonprofit educational institutions").
129. 1989 Senate Software Hearings, supra note 12, at 69 (statement of Bruce M. Kennedy,
Chairman of the Copyright Comm., American Ass'n of Libraries). The Congress rejected
these same "legitimate uses" arguments offered by the libraries when it decided that there was
no legitimate reason for retail rentals. See supra text accompanying notes 109-117.
130. Congress realized that there is little difference between library lending and retail rent-
ing in terms of the economic factors that induce copying of software. See H.R. REP. No. 735,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6939. Congress therefore
included a provision in the Software Act specifically requiring that the Register of Copyrights
report to Congress in three years regarding whether the library exemption "has achieved its
intended purpose of maintaining the integrity of the copyright system while providing non-
profit libraries the capability to fulfill their function." 17 U.S.C.A. § 109(b)(2)(B). There are,
however, some important distinctions between for-profit retail rentals and nonprofit library
rentals: Because they are not making profits, it can be assumed that libraries would have fewer
programs available and would not advertise or otherwise actively encourage rental.
131. House Software Hearing, supra note 1, at 93-95. The fear was that the physical or
electronic acquisition of software which is routinely done by students and faculty would be
considered "in the nature of rental," 17 U.S.C.A. § 109(b)(l)(A), and hence would be covered
by the Software Act. House Software Hearing, supra note 1, at 94.
132. 17 U.S.C.A. § 109(b)(1)(A). This assumes that the nonprofit school or library was not
charging a fee for software-i.e., that the lending was not done for commercial purposes.
133. Sections 109(b)(2) and 109(b)(1)(B) were not in the original version of the bill, but
were added during the legislative process. Compare S. 2727, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1988),
reprinted in 1988 Senate Software Hearings, supra note 12, at 4 and S. 198, 101th Cong., 2d
Sess. 16 (1989), reprinted in 1989 Senate Software Hearings, supra note 12, at 3 with 17
U.S.C.A. § 109(b).
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The exemption for video games applies to software "embodied in or used
in conjunction with a limited purpose computer that is designed for playing
video games and may be designed for other purposes."'134 This exemption
was justified by the technical and market realities of video game rental. 35
The legitimate need for short term rental of video games is more established
than is the need for other types of software-the entertainment value of
games often wears off in a very short time. 136 Additionally, the exemption
only applies to games that are used with computers designed for the purpose
of game playing. These games cannot be copied on such computers or by
using any other equipment ordinarily available in this country."3 7 The video
game developers argued unsuccessfully that the rental of video games de-
stroys the market for sales of the games and thus takes away the financial
incentive to create new games.'
38
The final Software Act exemption encompasses software that cannot be
duplicated in the normal operation of the device on which the software is
run. This exemption was not in a version of the Software Act passed by the
Senate. '39 Had it not been included in the final bill, software copyright own-
134. 17 U.S.C.A. § 109(b)(l)(B)(ii).
135. It also appears to have been supported and opposed by parties with comparable lobby-
ing ability. The exemption was backed by video cassette rental chains, who also rent video
games, and opposed by the creators and retailers of video games. Compare House Software
Hearing, supra note 1, at 101 (statement of Bruce L. Davis, Chairman and Chief Executive
Officer, Mediagenic, Inc.) and id. at 203-4 (letters from Howard C. Lincoln, Senior Vice Presi-
dent, Nintendo of America, Inc.) and id. at 222-23 (letter from Charles Lazarus, Chairman of
the Board, Toys "R" Us) with 1989 Senate Software Hearings, supra note 12, at 75 (statement
of Troy Cooper, Vice President, Erol's, Inc.).
136. See, e.g., Lou Kesten, The Nintendo Rental Wars, NEWSDAY, July 12, 1989, pt. II, at
2. The market situation is similar to that of video cassette rentals. See supra notes 79-82 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of the reasons that consumers would rent other software,
see supra notes 109-117 and accompanying text.
137. See 136 CONG. REC. S5,845 (daily ed. May 8, 1990) (statement of Sen. Gorton).
138. See, e.g., House Software Hearing, supra note 1, at 215-17 (letter from James Charne,
Vice President, Absolute Entertainment, Inc.). In arguing that video game rental should not
be allowed, one executive claimed rentals had caused his company's A Boy and His Blob game
to fail in the sales market, thus making it difficult for his company to make money. Id. This
argument goes beyond Congress' stated purposes in passing the Software Act and, if adopted,
would represent a fundamental change in how the copyright law provides incentive to authors.
What the video game developer was claiming was not that rental undercuts its ability to re-
ceive a one time compensation for each copy of A Boy and His Blob that was sold, but that the
developer needs to be compensated more than once for each copy. Congress should not dis-
miss this reasoning out of hand; it may just be that society will benefit more from the increased
number of A Boy and His Blobs which would result if developers were compensated multiple
times per copy. Such a fundamental change, however, should only be made by Congress if it
realizes the extent of the change and examines the costs and benefits.
139. S. 198, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), 136 CONG. REC. S5,532 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 1990).
This version was superseded by S. 198, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), 136 CONG. REC. S16,302-
03 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1990).
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ers would have had the power to limit the rental of automobiles, microwave
ovens, airplanes, and many other common products that contain copy-
righted software." Because the Software Act applies to "any medium em-
bodying a [computer] program," the owners of the copyrights on the
software in these devices could have prevented their rental or could have
charged more for versions intended for the rental market. There is no rea-
son to give them this power because, given the extreme difficulty which
would be involved in such duplication, there is essentially no danger that this
software will be duplicated.'41 The problem was avoided by the addition of
a subsection that removes from the purview of the Software Act computer
programs embodied in a machine or product "which cannot be copied dur-
ing the ordinary use of that machine or product."' 142 Had the original ver-
sion been enacted, Congress would have almost assuredly been forced to
amend the law by adding an exemption similar to the one it ultimately cre-
ated. The unacceptable consequences that the Senate's original version
would have caused highlights the need for caution in regulating the field of
software copyright.
C. Rentals Which Congress Probably Did Not Even Consider
The Software Act may unnecessarily inhibit some rental arrangements
that are unlikely to facilitate copyright infringements. One example is the
140. House Software Hearing, supra note 1, at 15-16 (statement of Chairman Kastenmeier).
The software in these devices controls electronic and mechanical operations, is transparent to
the users, and has been found to be protected by the copyright law. See id. at 149 (letter of
Richard H. Stem, Chairman, Intellectual Property Subcomm. of the Comm. on Public Policy
Institute of Elect. and Elect. Eng'rs, Computer Soc.) (citing NEC Corp. v. Intel Corp., 10
U.S.P.Q.2d 1177 (N.D. Cal. 1989)); H.R. REP. No. 650, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1990), re-
printed in, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6939 (discussing the rationale for the exemption); House
Software Hearing, supra note 1, at 30 (testimony of Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights).
141. The reason it is so difficult to copy this software is that, unlike personal computers,
these devices are not designed to allow software duplication.
142. 17 U.S.C.A. § 109(b)(1)(B)(1)(i). Representative Brooks explained this subsection in
his remarks to the Senate as follows:
I have also heard concern that [§ 109(b)(1)] would interfere with the existing legiti-
mate rental market for machines that are not themselves computer[s] but which con-
tain computer programs. . . In my view, the provisions of new subsection
109(b)(l)(i) adequately allow the rental of computer hardware that embody com-
puter programs which cannot be copied during the ordinary operation or use of that
machine, including the lease or lending of computers embodying software, by, for
example, hotels and airports for patrons' individual business purposes. The touch-
stone in all these cases is whether the computer program embodied in the computer
being rented or leased can be copied during the ordinary operation of the computer.
H.R. 5316, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), 136 CONG. REC. H13,315 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990).
No mention was made in the hearings or debates on the bill about how "ordinary use"
would be defined.
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Act's effect on the expanding practice of personal computer system rental. 143
Personal computer rentals normally include software stored in the com-
puter's memory." Because this software can be copied in the normal oper-
ation of the computer, it will usually be covered by the Software Act. It is
unlikely, however, that personal computer systems are rented for purposes
of duplicating the included software. This software is usually common 145
and the would-be infringer could obtain access to it by more convenient and
less expensive means. Under the Software Act, software copyright owners
can charge a higher price for programs included with rented personal com-
puters or force renters to buy their own copies of the programs. Either way,
computer rental would be unjustifiably more expensive and less attractive.
Another example of rental transactions unnecessarily affected by the Act
is commercial leasing of customized "turnkey" software systems. Turnkey
systems are software systems arranged to fit a user's specific needs and may
contain copyrighted programs purchased from many different software de-
velopers. 146 Although these systems are usually licensed to the end users, it
would appear unlikely that the software is illegally duplicated. Custom
software developers have a greater interest than retail rental dealers in ensur-
ing that the software has not been duplicated because such duplication
would have a more dramatic impact on their business. Duplication is also
more difficult because turnkey systems are often more complex. In addition,
illegal duplication may not be cost effective because of the expense of setting
143, See House Software Hearing, supra note 1, at 156 (letter from Personal Computer
Rentals, a micro computer rental franchise); John Hamlet et al., To Buy or Not to Buy, WHICH
COMPUTER?, June 1990, at 42, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File. Among the
reasons for leasing computer equipment are a lack of funds necessary for an up-front purchase,
id., and a desire to try the equipment to see if it performs up to expectations.
144. See, e.g., Candice Goodwin, Soft Market for Leases, IBM SYSTEM USER, Jan. 1990, at
28, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File. At the very least, these rented computers
normally include a copyrighted operating system, which is a computer program necessary to
direct the computer's internal operation. See PETER NORTON, INSIDE THE IBM PC AND PS/
2 267 (4th ed. 1990); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer, Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1249
(3d Cir. 1983) (holding that operating system programs can be copyrighted), cert. dismissed,
464 U.S. 1033 (1984); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir.
1984) (same).
145. See Goodwin, supra note 144, at 28 (listing types of software which may be included).
146. See Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Technology, 939 F.2d 91, 93 (3d Cir. 1991)
(describing the business of defendant Step-Saver Systems, a maker of turnkey systems); House
Software Hearing, supra note 1, at 31 (statement of Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights); see
also LAURENS R. SCHWARTZ, 1992 COMPUTER LAW FORMS HANDBOOK § 2.1 (1992); Steve
Higgins, Wang Ships Sophisticated Turnkey System, PC WEEK, March 12, 1990, at 33, 39
(describing a turnkey system containing the WordPerfect and Lotus 1-2-3 programs, among
other components). As Schwartz explains, "In the computer market, a turnkey system means
hardware, software and maintenance such that at the turn of a key ... the system is up and
running." SCHWARTZ, supra, § 2.1.
1991]
Catholic University Law Review
up a turnkey system. Under the Act, owners of copyrights in the individual
system component programs, due to competitive pressure, either can charge
a premium price in exchange for giving turnkey system developers permis-
sion to lease their software or can withhold such permission entirely. 14 7
This would prevent turnkey system developers from selling their systems or
force them to charge a higher price.
D. The Future of Rentals and the First Sale Doctrine
As society moves further into the digital age, creative works are increas-
ingly stored electronically rather than in the traditional printed form. 148
The line separating computer software from other types of works is becom-
ing less clear, and consequently, any manipulation of the computer software
marketplace will have a more dramatic impact. 149 Electronic storage for-
mats often wed copyrighted computer software with other creative works on
a single storage media, as is the case with databases stored on compact disc
read only memory (CD-ROM)1 50 and with multimedia works.15 1 Because
147. Cf House Audio and Video Hearings, supra note 11, at 157-58 (testimony of Father
Robert McEwen, S.J.) (discussing the effect that giving record rental rights to copyright own-
ers would have on the market); id. at 246-47 (statement of economist Nina W. Cornell) (dis-
cussing the effect that giving video cassette rental rights to copyright owners would have on
the market).
148. See Philip Elmer-Dewitt, The World on a Screen, TIME, Oct. 21, 1991, at 80; A.M.
Hendley, Optical Discs as Media for the Delivery of Information Products to the Customer, in
ELECTRONIC PUBLISHING: THE NEW WAY TO COMMUNICATE 177, 179 (Franco Mastroddi
ed., 1987).
149. See House Software Hearing, supra note 1, at 30-31 (statement of Ralph Oman, Regis-
ter of Copyrights). At a hearing on the Software Act, United States Register of Copyrights
Ralph Oman warned that "[t]he economic significance of [this] bill looms larger in the future
as more and more works are digitized and the relationship between machines and computer
software is intensified. If Congress legislates excessive protection, creativity in software devel-
opment will be stifled." Id. at 30.
150. CD-ROM is an optical storage medium on which computers store data and has been
called "the most promising medium for the distribution of text, data and computer graphics."
Hendley, supra note 148, at 179. Examples of works currently available on CD-ROM are the
Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory and a phone directory containing listings for the entire
United States. See Mary Brandt Jensen, CD-ROMLicenses, CD-ROM PROFESSIONAL, March
1991, at 13; N.R. Kleinfield, The Man With All the Numbers, N.Y. TIMES, April 14, 1991, at
Fl0 (describing a CD-ROM phone directory containing 90 million listings). CD-ROMs are
accessed by search and retrieval software. See Bill Zoellick, File System Support for CD ROM,
in CD ROM: THE NEW PAPYRUS 103 (Steve Lambert & Suzanne Ropiequet eds., 1986) (dis-
cussing the design of CD-ROM file system support software). Commentator Jane Brown has
predicted that CD-ROM "may alter the entire infrastructure of the publishing industry as we
know it today." Jane E. Brown, An Overview of Online and CD-ROM Publishing Technology,
CD DATA REPORT, Dec. 1987, at 9, 11.
151. Multimedia has been defined as "[tihe combination of graphics, sound, animation and
video in a single software program." David English, Multimedia Glossary, COMPUTE, Apr.
1992, at S-16. That is, multimedia allows for the combination of books, movies, musical re-
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multiple copyrighted works are being stored on one media, allowing
software copyright owners to prevent the rental of the software component
also gives them the power to prevent the rental of the other works with
which the software is combined. 152
Rental transactions involving combined works resemble the transactions
that the § 109(b)(1)(B)(i) exemption was designed to handle.' 53 The "prob-
lem" in both cases is that the software copyright owner is able to control the
rental of items even though the renter was not interested, and is probably
unaware of, the software that directs the operation of the item he is renting.
There are two important distinctions between combined works rentals and
the situations at which § 109(b)(l)(B)(i) was aimed. The first is that the
software in combined works transactions probably could be copied in the
normal operation of the device which it operates, and hence the
§ 109(b)(1)(B)(i) exemption would not apply.' 54 The more important dis-
tinction is that in combined works transactions the renter may be able to
duplicate the non-software component; that is, he may be able to copy the
creative work that he was interested in when he rented the item.
These factors raise two issues. The more immediate is the Software Act's
effect on the marketplace for creative works that are combined with software
that is copyable in the ordinary operation of the computer. It is possible that
the Software Act may not affect this market because most of these works
cordings, and computer programs into a single presentation. See Sueann Ambron, Introduc-
tion, in INTERACTIVE MULTIMEDIA 3 (Sueann Ambron & Kristina Hooper eds., 1988)
(predicting that multimedia will change the way we look at knowledge and give us a new vision
of reality). An integral component of a multimedia system is computer software. See Mike
Liebhold, A Layered Theory of Design for Optical Disc Software, in INTERACTIVE MUL-
TIMEDIA 294 (Sueann Ambron & Kristina Hooper eds., 1988).
152. Media such as CD-ROM and multimedia may contain software that could be copied
in the normal operation of the computer which reads them. See Liebhold, supra note 15 1, at
294.
153. 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(2)(B)(i) (West Supp. 1991). See supra notes 140-42 and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of § 109(b)(2)(B)(i).
154. Because it determines who has the rental rights, the question of whether the software
can be copied in the normal operation of the device is of central importance. It is impossible to
say what future duplication capabilities will be because the technical layout has yet to be stan-
dardized. See Elmer-Dewitt, supra note 148, at 80. The search and retrieval software for
many CD-ROMs is normally copied into the internal storage memory of the computer on
which it is run, and it would appear that multimedia works would have to be copied into
internal memory if they are run on computers which conform to the current architectural
design standard. Arguably, this was not the type of duplication which Congress meant to
bring a device outside of the § 109(B)(1)(b)(i) exemption. On the other hand, 17 U.S.C.A.
§ 117(1) was designed with the apparent belief that this type of duplication would be classified
as "copying" under 17 U.S.C. § 106(l) (1988). See UNITED STATES NATIONAL COMMISSION
ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL REPORT 13 (1979); supra
notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
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may be licensed to the users and never sold,' 55 in which case the first sale
doctrine would not become operative. The more interesting issue involves
the question of whether the first sale doctrine should be further modified as
all works become as easy to duplicate as software is today. If all commonly
used creative works can be duplicated as easily as software can be dupli-
cated, the same rationale which justified the Software Act may apply to these
works: The public may be better served if their alienability is restricted.
Providing the public with access to creative works, however, is the central
theme of the copyright law. The copyright law does not seek to foster ex-
pression for expression's sake alone, but rather society access to that expres-
sion. The question of whether copyright owners should have the power to
control the disposition of works should be answered only after carefully bal-
ancing the over-arching desire to provide public access against the degree to
which duplication of works will destroy the market and take away the incen-
tive to create. When Congress reconsiders the Software Act as it sunsets in
1997, and when it is faced with other attempts to reform the first sale doc-
trine, the goal of the copyright law must be kept in focus.
IV. CONCLUSION
A copyright gives the owner certain exclusive rights over the use and du-
plication of works of authorship in order to provide incentives for the crea-
tion of new works. The first sale doctrine extinguishes the copyright owner's
exclusive right to distribute an individual copy of his work when he sells or
otherwise disposes of that copy. The doctrine reflects a decision that the
public benefit derived from free alienability of creative works outweighs the
increased incentive to create that would stem from authors' indefinitely con-
trolling distribution of individual copies.
The Computer Software Rental Amendments Act of 1990 modified the
first sale doctrine in an attempt to reduce the illegal duplication of software.
Software rental encourages duplication and provides would-be copyright in-
fringers easy access to programs. Although there is no real evidence either
way, it is likely that the limitations on retail software rental that software
155. At present, CD-ROM products are usually licensed to the user, see Jensen, supra note
150, at 13, but it is unclear whether this trend will continue. The owner of the copyright on
the software in a CD-ROM may be different from its distributor and from the owner of the
copyright on the CD-ROM. For example, the license agreement printed on the back of the
case to the CD-ROM which was used in researching this Note states that the copyright of the
database is owned by one party, while the copyright in the search and retrieval software is
owned by at least two other parties. License Agreement for the Computer Select CD-ROM
(Sept. 1991) (on file with author). The arrangement of the licensing agreements may become
more difficult as the market becomes more complex. See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying
text.
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developers will now impose will benefit the public by preventing the erosion
of software developers' ability to sell and, hence, incentive to create com-
puter software. However, the Software Act exceptions that Congress did
allow, did not allow, and almost did not allow reflect a lack of adequate
Congressional consideration. The utmost care should be taken when regu-
lating the dynamic and pervasive field of computer software to prevent unan-
ticipated results. More importantly, as the boundary between computer
software and other creative works becomes less clear, care must be taken to
ensure that the free alienability of creative works is not unduly restricted.
Kenneth R. Corsello

